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The Effectiveness of the Best Interests Duty – Enhancing 
Consumer Protection? 
Stephen Corones and Thomas Galloway* 
This article considers the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the best interests duty which 
forms part of the Government’s Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms. It is likely to be 
many years before the courts can interpret and clarify the content of the duty. Under the new 
regime, the provision of personal financial advice will be made more difficult, complex and 
costly and these costs will be passed on to consumers. The article also considers whether 
there will still be scope for delivering standardized, non-tailored advice in the light of the best 
interests duty. In the pas standardized advice has allowed large amounts of low-level, 
generic advice to be delivered very efficiently. In order to avoid breaching the best interests 
duty standardized advice should only be used rarely, and only after a careful assessment has 
been made to ensure that a standardized approach is appropriate. 
I. Introduction 
On 25 June 2012, the Australian Parliament passed two pieces of legislation: the 
Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) (FOFA 
measures) and the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) 
Act 2012 (Cth) (Further Measures Act). These acts constitute the government’s ‘Future of 
Financial Advice’ reform package, designed to address the problem of low quality financial 
advice in Australia and the associated lack of confidence in advice providers. These problems 
were brought to the fore by the Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia and 
its subsequent report (the Ripoll report). As the government’s legislative response, the 
primary purpose of the FOFA reforms is to improve the quality of personal advice1 provided 
to retail consumer investors,2 thereby increasing consumer confidence.3 A secondary 
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1 Defined in s 766B(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): ‘personal advice is financial product advice 
that is given or directed to a person … in circumstances where –  
(a) the provider of the advice has considered one or more of the person’s objectives, financial 
situation and needs ...; or 
(b) a reasonable person might expect the provider to have considered one or more of those 
matters’.  
2 Section 761G(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that for purposes of Chapter 7, financial 
advice is provided to retail clients unless it can be shown that the person to whom the advice is given 
is a ‘sophisticated’ investor (s 761GA). 
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purpose is to facilitate greater access to financial advice.4 To this end, the FOFA legislation 
contains three key reforms:5 a duty requiring providers of financial advice to act in the best 
interests of their clients,6 a ban on conflicted remuneration,7 and the introduction of a so-
called ‘opt-in’ requirement.8 This article considers the first of these reforms and assesses its 
effectiveness.   
The article is divided into five Parts. Part two provides some background to the FOFA 
reforms and, specifically, the best interests duty. It considers the problems identified in the 
Ripoll inquiry and the government’s objectives for the FOFA reforms. It also examines the 
pre-existing protections available to consumers in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act) and under the 
common law.  Part three then discusses the best interests duty and the associated duty of 
priority in detail. It highlights the differences between the best interests duty and what was 
originally recommended in the Ripoll report, namely, the adoption of a statutory fiduciary 
duty. Part four assesses whether the best interests duty is likely to be effective. The 
following four criteria have been adopted:    
1. Is the best interests duty directed at addressing the problems identified by Ripoll? 
2. Does the best interests duty provide a proper balance between certainty and 
flexibility? 
3. Is the best interests duty able to be effectively enforced? 
4. Will the best interests duty add significant new costs, and if so, do the benefits of 
the new law outweigh those additional costs? 
Each criterion is considered in turn. It is argued that, while the best interests duty is broadly 
directed at addressing the problems identified by Ripoll and it appears to amend at least 
some of the deficiencies of the pre-existing regime, its scope is uncertain and will cause 
confusion. The effects of this uncertainty will create problems with enforcing the legislation, 
                                                                                                                                           
3 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) 3. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Whilst these reforms are now in effect, compliance will not be mandatory until 2013. 
6 Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 
23, pt 7.7A div 2 (‘Further Measures Act’). 
7 Ibid pt 7.7A  div 4 subdiv C.  
8 Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 10, pt 
7.7A div 3.  
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and it will add significant compliance costs to the advice industry, affecting both providers 
and consumers alike. It will take many years and many cases before it is clear how the best 
interests duty operates. In the meantime, consumer investors are unlikely to take actions to 
enforce their rights until the uncertainty has been resolved. In sum, it is argued that the best 
interests duty is unlikely to be an effective piece of consumer protection legislation.  
II. Background to the best interests duty and the 
pre-existing protection regime 
The FOFA legislation is the product of the government’s reform agenda to improve the 
quality of financial advice in Australia. The initial trigger for the reforms was the collapse of 
several major financial advice institutions, including Storm Financial, which prompted the 
Ripoll inquiry by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
(PJC), chaired by the Hon Bernie Ripoll MP. The Ripoll inquiry evaluated the pre-existing law 
that regulated the provision of financial advice in Australia.9 While the Ripoll inquiry focused 
on the failures of two particular institutions (Storm and Opes Prime), the evidence received 
in the course of the inquiry pointed to broader issues within the financial advice industry.10 
The core issue identified was that conflicts of interest were pervasive and that conflicted 
advice was ‘manifesting’ itself as ‘poor quality or inappropriate advice to consumers’.11 This 
concern is not unfounded. A recent shadow shopping study by ASIC considered 64 examples 
of personal advice given to retail consumers, finding that 58% were ‘adequate’, 39% ‘poor’, 
and only 3% ‘good quality’.12  
The Ripoll inquiry concluded that the pre-existing regulatory regime, based on the so-called 
‘efficient market’ hypothesis,13 had proven inadequate to prevent conflicts of interest 
driving down the quality of financial advice.14 There are three categories of obligations 
under the pre-existing regime: conduct obligations, disclosure obligations and education and 
training obligations. The education and training obligations are outside the scope of this 
article. The primary focus of the article is on the first two sets of obligations, to be found in 
the Corporations Act, the ASIC Act and under the common law. The following sections of this 
part of the article briefly analyse these two categories of pre-existing obligations.   
                                                 
9 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, 
Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia (2009) 1 [1.1] (‘Ripoll report’).  
10 Ibid 50 [3.129]. 
11 Ibid 74 [5.24]. 
12 ASIC, ‘Report 279 – Shadow Shopping Study of Retirement Advice’ March 2012, 8 [18]. 
13 Ripoll report, 7 [2.2] (referring to ASIC’s submission to the inquiry). 
14 Ibid 87 [5.74]–[5.75]. 
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A. Conduct obligations 
Corporations Act 
The Corporations Act sets out conduct obligations incumbent upon providers of financial 
advice in Parts 7.6, 7.7 and 7.10. Part 7.6 contains general obligations that apply to holders 
of Australian financial services licences (AFSL licensees). The obligations include: 
• [Doing] all things necessary to ensure that the financial services covered by the 
licence are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly; and 
• [Having] in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of 
interest that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities undertaken by the 
licensee or a representative of the licensee in the provision of financial services as 
part of the financial services business of the licensee or the representative.15 
Part 7.7 is primarily concerned with disclosure obligations; however, prior to the passing of 
the FOFA legislation it contained two key conduct requirements. These obligations applied 
when AFSL licensees or their authorised representatives provided personal advice to retail 
clients. Section 766B(3) defines personal advice as financial product advice given in 
circumstances where the advice provider considers one or more of their client’s ‘objectives, 
financial situation and needs’16 or where a reasonable person might have expected the 
provider to consider such.17 Section 761GA states that financial product advice is given to a 
retail client unless the client is a ‘sophisticated investor’. The first of these two requirements 
was the ’appropriateness’ rule, which required that providing entities have a reasonable 
basis for the advice given.18 The second requirement obliged entities providing financial 
advice to warn clients if the advice they gave was based on incomplete or inaccurate 
information.19 These two sections of the Corporations Act have been repealed by the FOFA 
legislation, and revised and updated versions of those rules have been re-enacted.20  
Part 7.10 contains a number of market misconduct provisions in relation to financial 
products and financial services (including financial advice). Section 1041E prohibits the 
making of false or misleading statements. Section 1041F prohibits persons from inducing 
other persons to deal in financial products using false, misleading or deceptive information. 
                                                 
15  Corporations Act, s 912A(1)(a)–(aa).  
16 Ibid s 766B(3)(a). 
17 Ibid s 766B(3)(b). 
18 Ibid s 945A, as repealed by the Further Measures Act. 
19 Ibid s 945B, as repealed by the Further Measures Act. 
20 Further Measures Act sch 1 item 23, ss 961G, 961H. 
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Section 1041G prohibits dishonest conduct in the course of carrying on a financial services 
business, in relation to a financial product or financial service. Section 1041H prohibits 
misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial products and financial services. 
ASIC Act 
The ASIC Act also regulates the conduct of financial advice providers, given ASIC’s role as a 
specialist consumer protection regulator for financial services. Part 2, Div 2 of that Act sets 
out a range of obligations that regulate the conduct of advice providers. These obligations 
are divided into four sections: subdivision BA deals with unfair contract terms; subdivision C 
is concerned with unconscionable conduct; subdivision D sets out various consumer 
protection obligations, eg the prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct; and 
subdivision E implies warranties of due care and skill and fitness for purpose into contracts 
for the supply of financial services to consumers.  
From 2006 to 2010, Australia underwent a fundamental revision and reform of its generic 
consumer protection laws, resulting in the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).21 For reasons 
that are not entirely clear, the government decided to exclude financial services from many 
of those reforms. The Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law (IGA), 
signed by COAG on 2 July 2009 required the Commonwealth to enact changes to the 
consumer investor protection provisions of the ASIC Act, and to the extent necessary, the 
Corporations Act, to ensure that they are consistent with the ACL.22 Relevant amendments 
to the ASIC Act are included in Sch 3 of the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian 
Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth). The IGA made it clear that financial services would be 
carved out of the scope of the ACL, and separate legislative arrangements would be made 
for the regulation of financial services under the Corporations Agreement 2002.  
Section 131A (1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) provides: 
                                                 
21 On 24 June 2010, the Australian Parliament passed the second stage of the Australian Consumer 
Law (ACL) reforms, the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth). 
The first stage of the ACL reforms, the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act 
(No 1) 2010 (Cth), had been passed on 17 March 2010. The third stage of the ACL reforms, the Trade 
Practices (Australian Consumer Law) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No 1), were made on 
16 November 2010. These three pieces of primary and subordinate legislation comprise the 
Australian Consumer Law at the Commonwealth level. The States and Territories passed Application 
Acts which make the ACL a law of their respective jurisdictions. 
22 Sub-clause 3.1.3, Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law, signed by COAG 
on 2 July 2009 
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Despite section 131, this Division does not apply (other than in relation to 
the application of Part 5-5 of Schedule 2 as a law of the Commonwealth) to 
the supply, or possible supply, of services that are financial services, or of 
financial products. 
This carve-out for financial services means that the ACL (Cth) does not apply to financial 
services, which are regulated at the Commonwealth level by the Corporations Act and the 
ASIC Act. The ASIC Act continues to apply, separately, to financial services, with the ASIC as 
the national regulator. This reflects the current subject matter referral by the States and 
Territories set out in the Corporations Agreement 2002 and administered by the Ministerial 
Council for Corporations (MINCO). Clause 301(1) of the Corporations Agreement 2002 states 
that ‘the Commission [ASIC] will have sole responsibility for the general administration of 
the national law [which includes the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) and the ASIC Act].  
The consumer investor protection provisions of the ASIC Act have been amended to 
maintain consistency with the ACL. However, the consumer guarantees law in the ACL does 
not apply to financial services (with the exception of linked credit provider services).23 This is 
at odds with the policy objectives of consistency and uniformity which the ACL was intended 
to achieve. Section 12ED of the ASIC Act only implies warranties of due care and skill and 
fitness for purpose into contracts for the supply of financial services to a consumer in the 
course of a business.24 It is not explained in the extrinsic materials why other suppliers of 
professional services to consumers should be subject to the statutory duties contained in 
the consumer guarantees of due care and skill in s 60 of the ACL, and fitness for a particular 
purpose or desired result in s 61 of the ACL, but financial advisers are exempt from them. 
Bringing advice providers under that regime would probably have been a more 
straightforward way to improve the quality of financial advice. As will be shown below, the 
introduction of a separate best interests duty for financial advisers greatly complicates the 
existing regime of protections.  
Common law 
Providers of financial advice can also be subject to conduct obligations that arise under the 
common law. First, there is an implied contractual term in the provider-consumer retainer 
                                                 
23 See Corones, The Australian Consumer Law (2nd ed, Lawbook Co., Sydney, 2013) at [9.315] and 
[15.205]-[15.230]. 
24 There have been very few cases in which have sought to rely on a breach of these implied 
warranties. See, e.g., St George Bank Limited v Wright [2009] QSC 337 at [54]–[59] (McMurdo J); and 
Transmarket Trading Pty Ltd v Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 1 at [113]–[116] (Perram 
J). 
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that advice providers must exercise due care and skill. Secondly, financial advisers owe their 
clients a duty of care. Finally, in certain circumstances providers of financial advice owe a 
fiduciary duty to their clients.  
The contractually implied term of due care and skill was discussed in Hagen v Jan Heraud & 
Associates Pty Ltd.25 In that case, Byrne J appeared to treat the content of both the 
contractually implied term and the tortious duty of care as similar, saying that the claim in 
that case had to be approached the same way ‘whether it be put in tort or contract’.26 The 
question of law was whether the plaintiff’s superannuation consultant, in advising his client 
to invest in superannuation funds when she was not eligible to do so, was ‘in breach of the 
duty to exercise due care, skill and diligence’.27 Byrne J went on to say that this was to be 
assessed against the standard expected of ‘a qualified and ordinarily competent and careful 
investment adviser’.28 It was held that the superannuation consultant was in breach of his 
obligation. Byrne J said the defendant’s advice was ‘the result of wishful thinking in his 
client’s interests rather than the result of a careful and objective application of the facts to 
the regulations’.29 
Providers of advice who hold themselves out as professionals come under a duty of care in 
practising their profession.30 The Hong Kong case of Susan Field v Barber Asia Ltd31 is 
illustrative of this point. That case concerned a conservative, and inexperienced investor. 
The investor sought advice from the defendant, who advised her to borrow in one currency 
and invest in another.32 The Court held that this advice was not sufficiently tailored to the 
client’s instructions, and was unsuited to the client’s circumstances. Sir Anthony Mason 
highlighted this case in a speech regarding the duty of care of financial advisers, stating that 
‘the standard of care is one of reasonable skill appropriate to the position and status of the 
adviser’.33  
                                                 
25 Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Byrne J, Butterworth Cases, BC9803040, 2 July 1988.  
26 Ibid 8. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid 11.  
30 Midland Bank v Hett [1979] Ch 384, 411. See also NMFM Properties Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) 
(2001) 186 ALR 442 and Tomasetti v Brailey [2012] NSWCA 399. 
31 [2003] HKC 712. 
32 The Hon Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Professional Negligence’ (speech given to the SPAA SMSF National 
Conference, Brisbane, 23 February 2011) [3].    
33 Ibid [2].    
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In certain circumstances, providers of financial advice are also under a common law fiduciary 
duty. Fiduciary obligations have been characterised as arising in two sets of circumstances: 
first, where the exercise of one’s powers ‘has a capacity to affect the interests of another’ 
(for example, in the case of trustees); and, secondly, situations where persons act ‘for, on 
behalf of, or in the interests of, or with the confidence of another’.34 Advice provider-client 
relationships are usually instances of the latter. Fiduciaries must use their position to 
advance their clients’ interests, rather than their own.35 This translates into two 
proscriptions: first, fiduciaries are to avoid placing themselves in situations where conflicts 
of interest arise; and secondly, they are not to profit from their position without obtaining 
fully informed consent from their client.36 The sum of these two proscriptions can be 
described as a ‘duty of undivided loyalty’.37  
Cases have recognised situations where advice providers will owe fiduciary obligations to 
their clients. The High Court of Australia in Daly v The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited38 held 
that a fiduciary relationship existed between a firm of stockbrokers and its client. In that 
case, Dr Daly sought investment advice from Patrick Partners, a stockbroking firm. Dr Daly 
was advised not to purchase shares due to market volatility. The employee advising Dr Daly, 
Mr Toltz, suggested that money be placed as a deposit with the firm, adding that ‘the firm 
was as safe as a bank’.39 In fact, unbeknownst to Mr Toltz, the firm was in a ‘precarious 
financial situation’.40 Patrick Partners subsequently ceased trading, and Dr Daly sought 
compensation from the fidelity fund of the Sydney Stock Exchange.41 The relevant issue in 
that case was whether the failure to disclose the firm’s financial situation constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duty.42  
Gibbs CJ (with whom Wilson J agreed) stated that ‘the firm, which held itself out as an 
adviser on matters of investment, undertook to advise Dr Daly, and Dr Daly relied on advice 
which the firm gave him’.43 Brennan J, in a separate judgment, noted that the firm had not 
                                                 
34 PD Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Law Book Co, 1977) 2 [5]; The Hon Kevin Lindgren QC, ‘Fiduciary 
Duty and the Ripoll Report’ (2010) 28 Company and Securities Law Journal 435, 438. 
35 PD Finn, ‘Contract and the Fiduciary Principle’ (1989) 12 UNSW Law Journal 76, 84. 
36 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) CLR 41, 67. See also The Hon 
Justice BH McPherson, ‘Fiduciaries: Who Are They?” (1998) 72 The Australian Law Journal 288.  
37 The Trust Company, PJC 2011 Inquiry Submission 53, 2. See also Finn, above n 33, 83. 
38 (1986) 160 CLR 371 (‘Daly’).  
39 Ibid 375. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid 377. 
43 Ibid.  
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purchased shares for Dr Daly (in which case, a fiduciary relationship between stockbroker 
and client would have existed).44 Rather, ‘the question [was] whether, in advising Dr Daly, 
Patrick Partners were in the position of a fiduciary’.45 His Honour went on to say that  
whenever a stockbroker or other person who holds himself out as having expertise 
in advising on investments is approached for advice on investments and undertakes 
to give it, in giving that advice the adviser stands in a fiduciary relationship to the 
person whom he advises.46 
The judgment in Daly has been applied in other cases, notably in Aequitas v Sparad (No 100) 
Ltd,47 where Austin J stated: ‘the fiduciary relationship between financial adviser and client 
arises because the financial adviser, having held itself out as an adviser on matters of 
investment, undertakes a particular financial advisory role for the client’.48 
How, then, are financial advisers meant to discharge their fiduciary obligations? In this 
respect, there has been some debate about what the High Court said in Daly. Gibbs CJ noted 
that Patrick Partners had ‘a duty to disclose to Dr Daly the information in its possession 
which would have revealed that the transaction was likely to be a most disadvantageous one 
from his point of view’.49 Brennan J appeared to go considerably further. His Honour noted 
that the duty of an investment adviser was ‘a heavy one’.50 His Honour stated: 
His duty is to furnish the client with all the relevant knowledge which the adviser 
possesses, concealing nothing that might reasonably be regarded as relevant to the 
making of the investment decision including the identity of the buyer or seller of the 
investment when that identity is relevant, to give the best advice which the adviser 
could give if he did not have but a third party did have a financial interest in the 
investment to be offered, to reveal fully the adviser’s financial interest, and to 
obtain for the client the best terms which the client would obtain from a third party 
if the adviser were to exercise due diligence on behalf of his client in such a 
transaction.51 
This passage by Brennan J has proved to be contentious. The duties to which his Honour 
referred are prescriptive, requiring positive action on the part of the financial adviser. This 
framing of fiduciary obligations stands in contrast to the typically proscriptive nature of 
fiduciary duties as understood by Australian Courts (that is, duties requiring financial 
                                                 
44 Thornley v Tilley (1925) 36 CLR 1. 
45 Daly (1986) 160 CLR 371, 384 (Brennan J).  
46 Ibid 385. 
47 [2001] NSWSC 14 (‘Aequitas’).  
48 Ibid [307]. 
49 Daly, 377. 
50 Ibid 385.  
51 Ibid.   
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advisers not to act in certain ways).52 This is especially so given the High Court’s rejection of 
more progressive, prescriptive understandings of fiduciary obligations as applied by courts in 
the United States and Canada: 
Equity imposes on the fiduciary proscriptive obligations … But the law of this country 
does not otherwise impose positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act in the 
interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.53 
In Aequitas, Austin J sought to reconcile this inconsistency by taking ‘Brennan J’s dictum … to 
refer, for the most part, to the contractual aspects of the adviser-client relationship’. The 
difference in proscriptive and prescriptive obligations underscores the difference between 
the best interests duty and what was originally proposed by the Ripoll report, namely the 
adoption of a statutory fiduciary duty. This is discussed further below in the article.  
B. Disclosure obligations 
The Corporations Act requires AFSL licensees and their authorised representatives to provide 
certain information to their clients. Information is required to be disclosed in three separate 
documents that have to be provided to the client: the Financial Services Guide,54 the 
Statement of Advice,55 and (where necessary) the Product Disclosure Statement.56 The Act 
stipulates detailed requirements for each document. For instance, there are eight different 
requirements as regards the content of the Financial Services Guide including information 
concerning the products available, commissions charged and internal and external dispute 
resolution mechanisms.57 Whether these disclosure documents benefit consumer investors 
has been called into question58 and doubts about their effectiveness were a major theme in 
the Ripoll inquiry.59  
                                                 
52 Gillian Dempsey and Andrew Greinke, ‘Proscriptive Fiduciary Duties in Australia’ (2004) 25 
Australian Bar Review 1; but cf Firios’ argument that this ‘accepted orthodoxy’ should be 
reconsidered: Leon Firios, ‘Precluding Prescriptive Duties in Fiduciary Relationships: The Problems 
with the Proscriptive Delimitation’ (2012) 40 Australian Business Law Review 166. 
53 Breen v Williams (1986) 186 CLR 71. 113 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ). See also Patrick Parkinson, 
‘Fiduciary Law and Access to Medical Records: Breen v Williams’ (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 433, 
441–442. 
54 Corporations Act s 941A–941B. 
55 Ibid s 946A. 
56 Ibid s 1012A(3).  
57 Ibid s 942B. 
58 Gail Pearson, ‘Risk and the Consumer in Australian Financial Services Reform’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law 
Review 99, 123-4. 
59 See Section D of this Part, below.  
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C. Summary of pre-FOFA protections afforded to consumers 
in relation to poor quality financial advice 
The pre-FOFA protections available to consumers for poor quality financial advice are 
summarised in the following Table:  
Corporations Act 
(Chapter 7) 
• Breach of general AFSL duties (Part 7.6); 
• Breach of ‘appropriateness’ rule and duty to warn clients 
about advice based on incomplete or inaccurate information 
(Part 7.7 [revised and re-enacted]); 
• Breach of misconduct rules (Part 7.10); 
• Breach of disclosure obligations (Financial Services Guide; 
Statement of Advice; Product Disclosure Statement). 
ASIC Act (Part 2, 
Division 2) 
• Breach of prohibition against unfair contract terms 
(Subdivision BA); 
• Breach of prohibition against unconscionable conduct 
(Subdivision C); 
• Breach of any of the consumer protection provisions in 
Subdivision D; 
• Breach of any of the implied warranties in Subdivision E. 
Common law 
 
 
• Breach of duty of care; 
• Breach of implied contractual duty of professional financial 
advisers (requirement of due care and skill);  
• Breach of fiduciary duty. 
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Despite the apparent breadth of the pre-existing protections, the Ripoll inquiry found that 
consumers were not being adequately shielded from the effects of poor financial advice. The 
Ripoll inquiry exposed a number of failings of the pre-existing law.  
D. Failings of the pre-existing consumer protection law 
The essence of many of the criticisms toward the pre-existing law was that the underlying 
‘efficient markets’ philosophy had proven inadequate. Following the Financial System 
inquiry in 1997 (the Wallis inquiry), great faith was placed in the efficiency of markets to 
further the interests of retail consumers who chose to participate in financial markets.60 
Emphasis was placed on reducing information asymmetries and thus promoting informed 
consumer decision-making.61 Rather than regulating the quality of financial products 
(including financial advice),62 the pre-existing law sought to ‘promote transparency in 
financial markets’.63 This was based on the assumption that: 
investors, and consumers more generally, are rational economic beings who will 
best be protected by ensuring they have the necessary information to make prudent 
decisions.64 
ASIC’s submission to the Ripoll inquiry questioned this underlying philosophy, arguing that 
the Wallis approach ‘may no longer be appropriate given the breadth of retail investors 
today’.65 Kingsford-Smith has also made this argument, noting that all Australians are 
effectively forced to participate in financial markets because of the compulsory 
superannuation system.66  
Criticism of the pre-existing law was directed at the operation of specific consumer 
protection provisions, not just the guiding philosophy behind them. For example, the 
Industry Super Network in its submission to the Ripoll inquiry pointed out that the 
appropriateness rule in s 945A of the Corporations Act allowed advisers to make 
recommendations to clients that were not necessarily in their best interests.67 The 
                                                 
60 Deborah Ralston, ‘Policy Forum: Financial Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: Regulation of 
Financial Services’ (2009) 42(4) The Australian Economic Review 482, 483; Pearson, above n 57, 104.  
61 Ralston, above n 60. 
62 Pearson, above n 58. 
63 Ralston, above n 60. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ripoll report, 74 [5.24]. 
66 Dimity Kingsford-Smith, ‘ASIC Regulation for the Investor as Consumer’ (2011) 29 Companies and 
Securities Law Journal 327, 327–328; Dimity Kingsford-Smith, ‘Regulating Investment Risk: Individuals 
and the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 32(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 514, 518. 
67 Industry Super Network, Ripoll Submission 380, 17. 
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Committee agreed, stating that while the existing standards were ‘useful in that they 
prohibit clearly inappropriate advice … the threshold is low enough to allow advice that 
favours the adviser’s interests above those of the client’.68  
The impetus for reform was clear, and the Ripoll report made 11 recommendations on how 
to improve regulation of the provision of financial advice to retail clients. The first 
recommendation was that the Corporations Act be amended to explicitly include a fiduciary 
duty requiring financial advisers to put their clients’ interests ahead of their own.69 
However, the duty ultimately adopted in the Further Measures Act differs quite significantly 
from this.  
III. Best interests duty 
Before assessing the effectiveness of the best interests duty, it is necessary to explain the 
scope of the duty and how it is enforced. It is also important to examine how the industry is 
responding to the introduction of the duty, principally through public consultation on ASIC’s 
proposed guidance and through the updating of the Financial Planning Association’s  Code of 
Professional Practice.    
As a preliminary point, it is worth highlighting the application of both the specific best 
interests duty in s 961B of the Further Measures Act, and the associated duty of priority in s 
961J. Section 961(1) of the Further Measures Act states that Division 2, which includes both 
provisions, applies ‘in relation to the provision of personal advice’ to retail clients. ‘Personal 
advice’ and ‘retail client’ are terms used in the Corporations Act, and are explained above. 
Subsection 2 goes on to state that the Division applies to the individuals who provide 
personal advice. Whilst the duties are imposed on individuals, subdivisions F and G make 
AFSL licensees and authorised representatives responsible for breaches. This is discussed 
further below in section D.  
A. Section 961B 
Section 961B in the Further Measures Act provides: 
(1) The provider must act in the best interests of the client in relation to the advice. 
                                                 
68 Ripoll report, 87 [5.74]. 
69 Ibid 150.  
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(2) The provider satisfies the duty in subsection (1), if the provider proves that the 
provider has done each of the following:  
(a) identified the objectives, financial situation and needs of the client that were 
disclosed to the provider by the client through instructions;  
(b) identified:  
(i) the subject matter of the advice that has been sought by the client 
(whether explicitly or implicitly); and  
(ii) the objectives, financial situation and needs of the client that would 
reasonably be considered as relevant to advice sought on that subject 
matter (the client's relevant circumstances); 
(c) where it was reasonably apparent that information relating to the client's 
relevant circumstances was incomplete or inaccurate, made reasonable inquiries 
to obtain complete and accurate information;  
(d) assessed whether the provider has the expertise required to provide the client 
advice on the subject matter sought and, if not, declined to provide the advice;  
(e) if, in considering the subject matter of the advice sought, it would be 
reasonable to consider recommending a financial product:  
(i) conducted a reasonable investigation into the financial products that 
might achieve those of the objectives and meet those of the needs of the 
client that would reasonably be considered as relevant to advice on that 
subject matter; and  
  (ii) assessed the information gathered in the investigation;  
(f) based all judgements in advising the client on the client's relevant 
circumstances;  
(g) taken any other step that, at the time the advice is provided, would reasonably 
be regarded as being in the best interests of the client, given the client's relevant 
circumstances.  
Subsection 1 simply requires providers of financial advice to act in the best interests of their 
clients. No definition of ‘best interests’ is provided in the legislation. Rather than providing a 
definition what ‘best interests’ means, section 961B(2) consists of seven steps that, if taken 
by financial advisers, satisfy the general duty in s 961B(1). The steps are not meant to be ‘an 
exhaustive and mechanical checklist of what it is to act in the best interests of the client’,70 
and advice providers can fulfil the general duty without necessarily following all the steps in 
                                                 
70 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) 10 [1.25]. 
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s 961B(2). The section is intended to function as a ‘safe harbour’ defence that providers of 
advice can rely on if they are suspected of not having fulfilled the general duty articulated in 
s 961B(1). Each step is explained in more detail below –  
•  (a) Identified the objectives, financial situation and needs of the client that were 
disclosed to the provider by the client through instructions 
The Explanatory Memorandum describes this as the ‘starting point’ for providers of financial 
advice.71 The wording of this step aligns with the definition of ‘personal advice’ contained in 
s 766B(3) of the Corporations Act. On 9 August 2012 ASIC released its consultation paper on 
proposed guidance to the best interests duty. With respect to this step, the consultation 
paper notes that a client’s instructions might not be immediately clear (the client may not 
even know what his or her objectives, financial situation and needs are).72 Advisers must 
therefore clarify the clients’ instructions (which may be provided over the course of a 
number of communications)73 and ‘exercise their judgment’ when clients seek advice about 
life events.74  
• (b) Identified: 
o (i) the subject matter of the advice sought by the client (whether explicitly or 
implicitly); and 
o (ii) the objectives, financial situation and needs of the client that would 
reasonably be considered as relevant to advice sought on that subject 
matter (the client’s relevant circumstances)  
The second step requires providers of financial advice to ascertain what it is the client is 
seeking advice about. ASIC’s consultation paper lists some of the following factors as 
potentially being relevant to this inquiry: the reason the client is seeking advice; the 
outcomes they wish to achieve; how much the client is willing to pay for the advice; and the 
client’s risk profile.75 The consultation paper also notes that advice providers may discover 
that giving advice on a subject matter different from the one sought by the client would be 
better suited to the client’s objectives, financial situation and needs.76 In such cases, 
providers ought to discuss this with their client. The second step also requires providers of 
advice to ascertain which objectives, aspects of the client’s financial situation and needs are 
                                                 
71 Ibid 11 [1.31]. 
72 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Consultation Paper 182 – Future of Financial 
Advice: Best Interests Duty and Related Obligations – Update to RG 175 (9 August 2012), 45 [RG 
175.A53] (‘ASIC Consultation Paper 182’). 
73 Ibid [RG 175.A54]. 
74 Ibid 46 [RG 175.A55]. 
75 Ibid 47 [RG 175.A64]. 
76 Ibid 50 [RG 175.A78]. 
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relevant to the issue or question the client is seeking advice on. This is what the provider 
needs to take into account when giving advice to the client (s 961B(2)(g)). ASIC’s 
consultation paper states: ‘an advice provider needs to use their judgement in deciding on 
the scope of the advice, based on the subject matter of the advice sought by the client’.77  
• (c) Where it was reasonably apparent that information relating to the client’s 
relevant circumstances was incomplete or inaccurate, made reasonable inquiries to 
obtain complete and accurate information  
Providers of financial advice are only required to carry out this step when the information is 
relevant to the client’s interests. The test for what is ‘reasonably apparent’ is contained in s 
961C, which states: 
Something is reasonably apparent if it would be apparent to a person with a 
reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter of the advice that has been 
sought by the client, were that person exercising care and objectively assessing the 
information given to the provider by the client.    
The test is an objective one, and the threshold of which increases if the subject matter of the 
advice ‘is highly complex and technical in nature’.78 
• (d) Assessed whether the provider has the expertise required to provide the client 
advice on the subject matter sought and, if not, declined to provide the advice 
Providers of financial advice may generally be knowledgeable about particular classes of 
financial products. In some cases, however, if a client requests highly specialised advice or 
advice about a financial product or a class of financial products that the provider knows little 
about, then the provider may not have sufficient expertise to provide quality advice to that 
client. In such cases, providers of advice should decline to provide advice. Factors that the 
provider should consider, according to ASIC’s consultation paper, include the provider’s 
professional qualifications and training, as well as their knowledge and skills in advising 
about the product or strategy that might be recommending.79  
• (e) If, in considering the subject matter of the advice sought, it would be reasonable 
to consider recommending a financial product: 
o (i) conducted a reasonable investigation into the financial products that 
might achieve those of the objectives and meet those of the needs of the 
client that would reasonably be considered as relevant to advice on that 
subject matter; and 
                                                 
77 Ibid 46 [RG 175.A58]. 
78 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth), 12 [1.37].  
79 ASIC Consultation Paper 182, 52 [RG 175.A88]. 
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o (ii) assessed the information gathered in the investigation 
It is not necessary that advisers conduct an investigation into every product that is available 
on the market.80 It is expected that they will limit the scope of their advice by taking into 
account the needs and objectives of the client.81 This may require them to give advice 
beyond their approved product list.82 If a client requests the provider to consider specific 
products, the provider must investigate those products.83  
• (f) Based all judgments in advising the client on the client’s relevant circumstances  
This step ties in with s 961B(2)(a), reaffirming that the objectives, financial situation and 
needs of the client are the ‘paramount consideration’ in acting in a client’s best interests.84 
In some cases it may be that, given the client’s relevant circumstances, a financial product 
should not be recommended. ASIC’s consultation paper says that, in such cases, ‘complying 
with the best interests duty may require an advice provider to give the client non-product 
specific advice about, for example, debt levels, estate planning or Centrelink benefits’.85 
• (g) Taken any other step that, at the time the advice is provided, would reasonably 
be regarded as being in the best interests of the client, given the client’s relevant 
circumstances  
The final step in s 961B(2) operates as a ‘catch-all’ provision. In addition to demonstrating 
that steps (a) – (f) have been complied with, providers of financial advice must also be able 
to demonstrate that they took any other step that would reasonably be regarded as being in 
the client’s best interests. The test is an objective one: would a person with a ‘reasonable 
level of expertise in the subject matter [of the advice], exercising care and objectively 
assessing the client’s relevant circumstances’, regard it as in the best interests of a client to 
take a step?86 Section 961E clarifies what may be required here, defining what would 
reasonably be regarded as being in the best interests of the client:  
It would reasonably be regarded as in the best interests of the client to take a step, 
if a person with a reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter of the advice 
                                                 
80 Further Measures Act sch 1 item 23, s 961D(1); Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations 
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83 Further Measures Act sch 1 item 23, s 961D(2).  
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that has been sought be the client, exercising care and objectively assessing the 
client’s relevant circumstances, would regard it as in the best interests of the client, 
given the client’s relevant circumstances, to take that step (emphasis added).  
ASIC’s consultation paper offers some examples: explaining to the client the advice that is 
being provided (and what is not being provided); providing strategic recommendations 
about a financial product, in addition to recommending the product itself; and offering to 
provide advice on other key issues that are not part of the scope of the advice.87 
It is interesting to consider the best interests duty in s 961B in light of the alternative 
approach the Ripoll report recommended: 
The committee recommends that the Corporations Act be amended to explicitly 
include a fiduciary duty for financial advisers operating under an AFSL, requiring 
them to place their clients’ interests ahead of their own.88 
Despite this recommendation, the government’s FOFA Information Pack, released on 26 
April 2011, indicated that a different approach had been adopted: 
…the reforms will introduce a statutory fiduciary duty on [AFSLs] and their 
authorised representatives which will require them to act in the best interests of 
their clients (emphasis added).89 
As Part II showed, in certain circumstances the common law already imposes a fiduciary duty 
upon providers of financial advice. It also showed that the concept of the fiduciary duty in 
Australian law is proscriptive, not prescriptive. While it means that advice providers who are 
fiduciaries act in their clients’ interests, it does not mean they necessarily have to act in their 
best interests. While the government’s position appeared somewhat confused in the 
Information Pack, in the initial draft tranche of legislation the word ‘fiduciary’ was not used 
at all.90 This suggests that the government did not feel that introducing a statutory fiduciary 
duty that would apply in all circumstances would have been sufficient to meet its core 
objective of improving the quality of financial advice, and thus promoting confidence in 
providers of financial advice. Rather, it appears, a more prescriptive set of obligations were 
required that went directly to the manner in which advice providers conduct their business. 
Despite this apparent intention, the question about whether the best interests duty has a 
‘fiduciary character’ remains. The Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) in the Revised 
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Explanatory Memorandum, in canvassing the different options for potential regulation, 
speaks of  
Option F – [Introducing] a fiduciary-like statutory duty to act in the best interests of 
clients, subject to a ‘reasonable steps’ qualification and to place the client’s best 
interests ahead of their own.91  
The RIS goes on to state that a combination of the so-called Option B (the ban on conflicted 
remuneration) and Option F was the preferred approach to deal with the problem identified   
by the Ripoll Inquiry.92 This issue is discussed further below.93 Understanding the differences  
between the two alternative approaches illuminates many of the criticisms that can be 
made about the best interests duty. This discussion encompasses a comparison of a fiduciary 
duty with both ss 961B and 961J.  
Section 961B imposes a statutory duty that is different from a fiduciary duty because it 
imposes prescriptive obligations on providers of financial advice. As noted above, the core 
obligations of fiduciaries are treated (at least in Australia and the UK)94 as negative duties: 
duties to refrain from acting in a certain way. Under a statutory fiduciary duty advice 
providers would be required to act in their clients’ interests, but not necessarily in their best 
interests. Section 961B requires more than this because it frames the obligation as a 
standard of conduct. Financial advisers are required to take positive steps to satisfy the duty 
to act in their clients’ best interests.  
The effect of such an approach is to shift the regulatory focus onto the conduct of advice 
providers, rather than their motivations. Other aspects of the FOFA legislation deal with 
providers’ motivations, namely the ban on conflicted remuneration and the duty of priority. 
Insofar as s 961B is concerned, however, provider conduct is central. This is a very different 
approach  to that proposed in the Ripoll report. As noted by Kingsford-Smith in a submission 
to the government’s initial consultation process, there is no obligation in the common law 
that requires fiduciaries to ‘act for the utmost for the client – no [best interests] duty’.95 
Section 961B can thus be described as going beyond what a statutory fiduciary duty would 
require.  
                                                 
91 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) 56. 
92 Ibid [3.127]. 
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94 Dempsey and Greinke, above n 52. 
95 Dimity Kingsford-Smith, Exposure Draft Submission, 5–6.  
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The relationship between the concept of a fiduciary duty with s 961J is considered in the 
next section, which focuses on the duty of priority.  
B. Section 961J 
Whereas s 961B sets out the specific requirement to act in a client’s best interests, s 961J 
sets out the associated duty of priority. The addition of this section to the legislation was to 
rectify one of the major perceived shortcomings of the pre-existing regime – advice 
providers could fulfil their obligations whilst at the same time place their own interests 
ahead of their client’s.96 Section 961J requires providers to give priority to their clients’ 
interests where they know, or reasonably ought to know, that there is a conflict of interest 
between the client’s interests and the interests of any of the following: 
• the provider; 
• an associate of the provider; 
• an AFSL licensee of whom the provider is a representative; 
• an associate of an AFSL licensee of whom the provider is a representative; 
• an authorised representative who authorises a provider to provide a specified 
financial service on behalf of an AFSL licensee; or 
• an associate of such an authorised representative.97 
The section seeks to prevent the circumvention of the obligation through the use of related 
parties.98 The duty of priority, as with the best interests duty in s 961B, does not ban advice 
providers from selling their own products. What is required, however, is that any 
recommendation to do so be in the client’s best interests. These interests must have been 
put ahead of the interests of any others listed in s 961J(1). In this way, the section does not 
expressly prohibit advice providers from acting in their own interests. Advice providers are 
able to pursue their own interests, but only if they put their client’s interests first. If, after 
placing the client first, the advice provider were able to gain some benefit for him or herself 
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Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) 5–6 [1.4]. 
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that would not result in the client being placed in a sub-optimal position, then pursuing that 
benefit would not necessarily constitute a breach of s 961J. The FOFA Bills’ Explanatory 
Memorandum expressly states that the duty of priority ‘does not mean that the provider 
can never pursue its own interests or the interests of another party’.99 For instance, CP 182 
states that the duty of priority ‘does not prohibit an advice provider from accepting 
remuneration from a source other than the client’.100  
Considering s 961J in light of a fiduciary duty raises some important distinctions. While s 
961B appears to go beyond the standard of a fiduciary duty, s 961J (the duty of priority) 
appears to require less. The legislation (expanded since the initial Exposure Draft) requires 
providers of advice to give priority to the client’s interests when in conflict with the interests 
of others. Fiduciaries have a strict obligation to avoid conflicts of interest.101 Section 961J 
merely requires financial advisers to prioritise the interests of their clients, which might, at 
first glance appear to be a lower standard than that imposed under a fiduciary duty. Despite 
its appearance as being less onerous, however, three points should be noted about s 961J.  
First, while s 961J(1) appears to provide a closed list of persons whose interests cannot be 
pursued over client’s interests, its reference to ‘associates’102 greatly broadens the 
application of the section. The term ‘associate’ is given an expansive definition in the 
Corporations Act.103 Secondly, the duty of priority must be understood in conjunction with 
the other FOFA reforms. For instance, the inclusion of the ban on conflicted remuneration 
will most likely eliminate many potential conflicts of interest. Thirdly, the duty of priority 
must also be read alongside the specific best interests duty provision in s 961B. If a financial 
adviser were to give priority to the interests of a person or entity not covered by s 961J(1) 
over that of his or her client, it is unlikely that the adviser would be acting in the best 
interests of the client (such an action would be particularly vulnerable to being caught by 
the catch-all provision in s 961B(2)(g)). There is, however, another way in which s 961J can 
be seen to be less stringent than a fiduciary duty: the section is limited by the concept of 
reasonableness.104 It only requires providers of advice to give priority to their clients’ 
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interests when they know or reasonably ought to know that there is a conflict.105 The only 
way for a fiduciary to avoid liability in this regard is if informed consent is obtained from the 
client.  
C. Enforcing the new law 
The new FOFA legislation has made several changes regarding how the new law is to be 
enforced. Three aspects of the new approach to enforcement will be considered: first, the 
consequences of breaching of the new obligations; secondly, the expansion of ASIC’s 
enforcement powers; and, thirdly, the private dispute resolution system that operates in the 
financial advice industry. While the FOFA reforms have not made any changes to the role 
played by the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), it will continue to function as an 
important part of the legal regime governing the provision of financial advice and will thus 
be at the forefront of the FOFA reforms in practice.  
Consequences of breaching the new obligations 
Subdivisions F and G of the Further Measures Act govern the liability of AFSL licensees and 
authorised representatives, respectively. Sections 961K and 961Q provide that an AFSL 
licensee or an authorised representative that contravenes ss 961B or 961J is liable to pay a 
civil penalty for the purposes of s 1317G of the Corporations Act. AFSL licensees are under 
an additional obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure their representatives comply 
with ss 961B and 961J.106 This is also a civil penalty provision. Section 961M is headed ‘civil 
action for loss or damage’, and allows Courts to make compensation orders in respect of 
losses or damage resulting from breaches of ss 961B or 961J. Courts are permitted to make 
such orders on their own initiative, or on the application of ASIC or the injured client.107 
Thus, the Further Measures Act confers a private remedy for breaches of the best interests 
duty.  
ASIC’s expanded enforcement powers 
A number of amendments contained in the Further Measures Act expand ASIC’s 
enforcement powers. These amendments make several important changes to the issuing of 
AFSLs, the suspension or cancellation of licences and the power to issue banning orders. 
                                                 
105 Further Measures Act sch 1 item 23, ss 961J.  
106 Further Measures Act sch 1 item 23, s 961L.  
107 Ibid s 961M(3).  
 23 
Under the pre-existing provisions in sections 913B(1)(b), 915C(1)(aa) and 920A(1)(ba) the 
question was whether ASIC had reason to believe a person would not comply with section 
912A (the general duties of AFSL licensees). The test has been changed by the new 
legislation. The test is now whether ASIC has reason to believe a person is likely to 
contravene their obligations under section 912A. With respect to the making of banning 
orders, parallel changes are made to sections 920A(1)(f) and 920A(1)(h).  
Private dispute resolution 
Consumers who receive poor financial advice do not have to resort to the Courts to have 
their rights enforced. Consumers may attempt to resolve disputes internally with advice 
providers. One of the general obligations of AFSL holders is that, if services are provided to 
retail clients, a dispute resolution system must be put in place to handle consumer 
complaints.108 Such systems must consist of both an internal dispute resolution process and 
access to an external dispute resolution scheme (both in compliance with ASIC’s 
standards).109  
The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) is currently the only ASIC-approved external dispute 
resolution mechanism, the product of the merger of the Australian Banking Industry 
Ombudsman, the Financial Industry Complaints Service and the Insurance Ombudsman 
Service in 2008.110 The service handles complaints through a four-step procedure. 
Consumers must first register their dispute with the FOS.111 The FOS then notifies the 
financial service provider of the dispute, giving them the opportunity to provide an ‘internal 
dispute resolution’ response.112 Providers have 45 days to do this from the time they are 
notified of the dispute by the FOS or by the consumer him or herself.113 If the provider does 
not provide an internal dispute resolution response, or does not internally resolve the 
dispute to the consumer’s satisfaction, the dispute may be formally resolved by the FOS, 
which can negotiate, conciliate or mediate, or formally decide the dispute.114 Where 
disputes cannot be resolved by mutual agreement, the FOS decides disputes by issuing a 
Recommendation or a Determination following the consideration of submissions provided 
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by the parties to a dispute.115 Recommendations have to be accepted by both parties.116 If 
either party refuses to accept a Recommendation, the FOS issues a Determination.117 
Determinations are binding on the provider of the financial service if the consumer who 
lodged the dispute accepts it within 30 days of its issue.118  
Most disputes are resolved without a Determination. In its Annual Review for 2010-11, the 
FOS reported it had received 30,283 disputes, 71 per cent of which were resolved by 
agreement and only 10 per cent of which required a formal written decision.119 New Terms 
of Reference were introduced on 1 January 2010. Term of Reference 8.2 sets out the 
following as matters to which the FOS has regard when considering disputes: (a) legal 
principles; (b) applicable industry codes or guidance as to practice; (c) good industry 
practice; and (d) previous relevant decisions of the FOS or a predecessor scheme (although 
these are not binding).  
The FOS provides a less costly, more flexible method by which consumers of financial advice 
may hold providers to account. The benefits of the service are that it is free of costs for the 
consumers (unless they choose to seek legal advice) and that consumers are not restricted 
to a remedy only when they can demonstrate that an obligation in the Corporations Act, the 
ASIC Act or under the common law has been breached.   
The FOS received only 944 ‘advice’ related complaints in 2010-11.120 This may indicate that 
consumers were not aware of the service’s jurisdiction in relation to complaints about 
financial advice. It may also be indicative of more systemic issues. For instance, it may be 
that while consumers of financial services are ready and willing to complain in instances 
where, for example, an insurer has denied them cover, they are less likely to complain about 
the provision of poor or untailored financial advice.  
The FOS will have an important role to play when the FOFA reforms and the best interest 
duty becomes mandatory in 2013. Given the cost and complexity of litigation, the FOS will 
doubtless be required to interpret the new rules before they are subject to some (if any) 
judicial scrutiny. This issue is discussed further below. 
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D. Industry response 
This section is concerned with how the industry has responded to the best interests duty 
becoming law, and how businesses are planning to change in order to ensure compliance. Of 
prime importance is the Financial Planning Association’s (FPA) Code of Professional Practice, 
which will be updated to reflect the changes in the law.  
The new FOFA laws reflect a governmental policy of encouraging the development of 
industry codes of conduct. This is apparent in s 962CA of the FOFA Measures Act, which 
exempts persons, or classes of persons, from the opt-in requirement provided ASIC is 
satisfied that such a person or class of persons is bound by an approved code of conduct. 
Codes of conduct help to raise the ethical standards of the industry in ways that regulation is 
not always apt to do. The FPA’s Code of Professional Practice is one such code. In response 
to the FOFA legislation, including the new best interests duty, the FPA has initiated a 
consultation process on how best to update the Code to reflect the new laws. Pursuant to 
this process, the FPA released a Consultation Paper in October 2012, and invited 
stakeholders to make submissions. At the time of writing, the deadline for making 
submissions has passed, and the FPA is considering the responses.  
It is worth considering those aspects of the FPA’s Consultation Paper that concern the best 
interests duty and the provision of scaled advice.  The Consultation Paper itself is critical of 
the FOFA regime:  
[w]hilst the FPA has supported the intention of many of [FOFA’s objectives], we 
believe that these legislative changes will not deliver the consumer protection that 
Australians need or the professional respect that their professional financial 
planners deserve.121 
The Consultation Paper goes on to say that ‘we have avoided simply duplicating the 
language and requirements of the law and instead [have] focused on fixing the underlying 
problems that FoFA identified’.122  
The Consultation Paper proposes the adoption of four so-called ‘Best Interest Principles’ in 
order to have the Code meet the intentions underlying the best interests duty in the Further 
Measures Act. The Best Interest Principles comprise: 
• Principle 1: Fair Engagement; 
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• Principle 2: Professional Competence; 
• Principle 3: Professional Diagnosis; and 
• Principle 4: Recommend in Best Interest.123 
Whilst the FPA’s Code already has detailed requirements on how advice providers are to 
engage clients, these principles offer more general guidance. Their essence is perhaps best 
encapsulated in the Consultation Paper’s brief discussion of the fourth principle, to 
‘recommend in best interest’: ‘the Adviser should demonstrate that they intend to 
financially improve the client’s outcomes’.124  
The Consultation Paper does not elaborate to a great extent on the Best Interest Principles, 
instead favouring what is clearly the focus of its discussion on the best interests duty and the 
the provision of scaled advice. The Consultation Paper notes that ‘[a]t the moment, 
consumers, advisers and licensees are still faced with uncertainty in the way “scaled advice” 
operates under FoFA’.125 As a solution, the Consultation Paper argues for the establishment 
of ‘industry wide norms (standards) that identify the obvious (typical) issues that would arise 
given a typical set of circumstances for a typical client type’.126 Accordingly, the Paper 
introduces the concept of ‘Staged Advice’:  
a priority driven form of comprehensive financial planning [that] will focus the 
activity of the professional, and the compliance systems that underpin them, on 
solving the immediate client needs in a way that allows streamlining and cost 
efficiencies to emerge without the likelihood of consumer detriment and 
misrepresentation. 
The Staged Advice standard is divided into two broad elements: client needs and client 
types. First, the Staged Advice standard envisions a set of typical advice needs for ordinary 
Australians.127 These are the issues that clients most frequently request advice on, and the 
Staged Advice standard sets out a general guide as to how (relatively) complex these advice 
requests tend to be.128 The level of the complexity of the request determines the breadth of 
the fact-finding process, and the Consultation Paper gives some examples of the inquiries 
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advice providers should undertake with respect to certain advice requests.129 The second 
element of the Staged Advice Standard is the ‘client type’ element. This is intended to be 
applied in conjunction with the advice needs element.130 In short, the FPA recognises that 
just as different clients have different needs, clients may approach financial advisers at 
various stages in their lives. For different age groups, certain issues are more prominent 
than others, and Map 2 – ‘AGE based client types’ in the Consultation Paper describes what 
the typical advice needs are for different age groups.131   
Having analysed the specific provisions in the Further Measures Act, how they are to be 
enforced, as well as how the industry is putting these provisions into practice, the likely 
effectiveness of the best interests duty can now be assessed.  
IV. Assessing the best interests duty 
The Ripoll inquiry revealed substantial evidence of an identifiable problem in the advice 
industry, namely the poor standard of advice being provided to consumers and the low level 
of trust this has engendered in the minds of consumers regarding providers of financial 
advice. Is the best interests duty, likely to be effective in solving this problem?  
A. Is the best interests duty directed at addressing the 
problem identified? 
The first criterion asks whether government’s approach is directed at addressing the 
problem identified in Ripoll. There are several points that can be made in favour of the best 
interests duty. The first is that the best interests duty is squarely aimed at improving the 
quality of financial advice. It does this by framing the duty as one consisting of prescriptive 
obligations. This is a more direct strategy to improve the quality of financial advice than 
introducing a statutory fiduciary duty, as was suggested in the Ripoll report. A statutory 
fiduciary duty may have prevented advisers from giving conflicted advice, but it would not 
have required them to work to give their client the best advice possible.132 The best interests 
duty, by contrast, requires advice providers to take positive steps to provide flexible, 
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individualised advice for each specific client – advice based on the client’s circumstances, 
characteristics and needs: in short, advice that is in the client’s best interest. The second 
point is that the best interests duty goes some way to redressing the deficiencies in the pre-
existing legislative regime. The new legislation goes beyond the old Corporations Act 
provisions by setting conduct standards for individual advice providers, not just AFSL 
licensees or their authorised representatives.133 This remedies one of the problems with the 
pre-existing regime, namely that the ‘appropriateness’ requirement in the Corporations Act 
only applied to the ‘providing entity’ (licensees or authorised representatives), rather than 
individual advisers.134  
Despite these two points in favour of the best interests duty, there are significant criticisms 
that can be made about the way in which it addresses the problem of poor financial advice.  
Some argue that the way s 961B(2) attempts to provide a list of steps is flawed in that, 
rather than getting advisers to provide particularised advice, it may lead to the opposite – 
the adoption of a ‘box-ticking mentality’ where advisers do the minimum amount of work 
required to satisfy the steps, and no more.135 Craddock argues that one of the risks with the 
form of statutory prescription imposed by the best interests duty is that it ‘may promote 
minimum compliance’.136 The catch-all provision in s 961B(2)(g) weakens this argument 
somewhat, as it would appear to make it more difficult for advice providers to streamline 
the process for giving advice in such a way.  
Another major criticism of the way the best interests duty is directed is that it does not 
adequately provide for the scaling of advice. As stated at the outset, one of the goals 
secondary to FOFA’s primary goal of raising the standard of financial advice in Australia is 
facilitating greater access to advice.137 As the Revised Explanatory Memorandum notes, one 
way to promote greater access is through facilitating ‘the provision of simple or limited 
advice’.138 During the consultation process (both the Exposure Draft phase and throughout 
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the PJC inquiry into the FOFA Bills), the best interests duty was criticised for seemingly being 
incompatible with the provision of scaled advice. The government’s response was to insert a 
note into the legislation, after s 961B(2)(g), that states  
The matters that must be proved under subsection (2) relate to the subject matter 
of the advice sought by the client and the circumstances of the client relevant to 
that subject matter (the client’s relevant circumstances). That subject matter and 
the client’s relevant circumstances may be broad or narrow, and so the subsection 
anticipates that a client may seek scaled advice and that the inquiries made by the 
provider will be tailored to the advice sought.  
ASIC has released a separate consultation paper solely focused on scaled advice.139 ASIC’s 
consultation paper is concerned with  ‘what [an advice provider] must do to meet the legal 
requirements, including the best interests duty, [is able to be] “scaled up” or “scaled down” 
depending on the nature of the advice’.140 The consultation paper acknowledges that clients 
can and do seek advice on a wide range of issues, both broad and narrow in nature. This, it is 
argued, necessitates either the expanding or limiting of the fact-finding process, and the 
inquiries an advice provider must engage in before giving adequate advice.141 According to 
ASIC’s consultation paper, embarking on a more restricted fact-finding process following a 
request for advice on a very specific topic will not mean an advice provider will fall foul of 
the best interests duty. 
Despite the note in the legislation and the proposed guidance in ASIC’s consultation paper , 
there will be significant risks in the provision of scaled advice.   ASIC, in its consultation 
paper, noted that it would be up to the advice provider to exercise his or her professional 
judgment in assessing whether giving scoped or limited advice would be in compliance with 
the best interests duty.142 While the legislation permits the scaling of advice, the inquiries 
and processes that advisers must undertake (in following s 961B(2)) mean that advisers 
would be put on notice about certain circumstances of the client that may make it 
irresponsible to give limited advice. In such cases, what is in the best interests of the client 
would be providing more detailed and comprehensive advice. Giving scaled advice whilst 
complying with the best interests duty would only be possible where there is an initial 
agreement between the client and adviser that any advice will only concern a specific topic, 
product or issue. The adviser would also have to take great care to ensure that the client 
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appreciates the limited scope of the advice that was being given.143 Ultimately, an advice 
provider may be in a position where they know that it is not in the best interests of the 
client to scale advice. The best interests duty, especially the steps set out in s 961B(2) are 
designed to make sure providers gain that knowledge. This also means that the subject 
matter of advice sought by clients may not be able to be effectively revised or refined. Once 
the advice provider has become aware of crucial information about the client’s financial 
circumstances, he or she cannot pretend to be blind to that information simply because the 
client revises the subject matter of the advice they seek. As such, it can fairly be expected 
that the best interests duty will limit the ability of advisers to scale advice.144 This may, in 
turn, limit the availability of advice as some consumers may not be able to pay for more 
comprehensive advice.  
B. Does the best interests duty achieve the proper balance 
between certainty and flexibility? 
The Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Hon Bill 
Shorten MP, in his second reading speech said that the FOFA legislation ‘strikes a balance 
between certainty and flexibility for the adviser’.145 The Minister stated:  
...for the adviser that wants certainty around compliance above all else, the general 
obligation [in s 961B(1)] is supplemented by a provision [961B(2)] setting out steps 
which, if satisfied, will be deemed sufficient for the adviser to have fulfilled the 
general obligation.146 
Despite the Minister’s claim that the best interests duty gets the balance right, there are 
major problems with the formulation of the duty – problems that render it fundamentally 
uncertain. The purpose of the legislative steps in s 961B(2) was to clarify how to act in the 
best interests of the client; however, the question of how to comply with the duty remains 
beset by uncertainty. First, the term, ‘best interests’ is not defined in the legislation. 
Secondly, it is not clear whether the term ‘best interests’ in the Further Measures Act has 
the same meaning and scope, as it has in other legislative contexts. Thirdly, it is unclear 
whether the best interests duty is to be treated as a ‘fiduciary-like duty’. Fourthly, the 
‘catch-all’ provision in s 961B(2)(g) renders the legislative steps in s 961B fundamentally 
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uncertain. Finally, it is unclear how the best interests duty relates to the pre-existing 
consumer protections outlined above.  
‘Best interests’ is undefined 
The term ‘best interests’ is not defined in the legislation. Section 961B(2) sets out only one 
way of fulfilling the obligation,147 and it does not provide a definition of what ‘best interests’ 
entails. Section 961E addresses the question of when something can reasonably be regarded 
as being in the best interest of clients. This section, however, is aimed at clarifying the catch-
all provision in s 961(2)(g), which requires providers of advice to take any other steps that 
‘would reasonably be regarded as being in the best interests of the client’. Therefore, the 
general obligation to act in the best interests of the client in s 961B(1) is not supplemented 
by a conclusive test or definition of what best interests means.  
Relationship with other ‘best interests’ legislative provisions  
The uncertainty of the government’s reform is compounded by the fact that the term ‘best 
interests’ exists in other legislation, namely s 52(2)(c) of the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act and ss 601FC(1)(c) and 601FD(1)(c) of the Corporations Act. According to 
some commentators, the best interests duty in the Further Measures Act works 
differently.148 Beyond this, it is not clear how the term as used in the Further Measures Act 
will be interpreted in light of these other legislative instances of the term ‘best interests’.  
There are also parallels between the best interests duty and the consumer guarantees 
contained in ss 60 and 61 of the ACL. Section 60 requires that service suppliers render their 
services with ‘due care and skill’. Section 61 requires that services be ‘reasonably fit’ for any 
disclosed purposes or intended results which are sought to be achieved. There is no 
definition of ‘due care and skill’ in s 60 the ACL. The first requirement in s 60 is that the 
supplier of services has an acceptable level of skill. This is the level of skill necessary to 
complete the contract in an acceptable way. It is necessary to have regard to the nature of 
the services, the cost of the services, any statements made about the services, any 
representations made about the services by the provider and other relevant circumstances. 
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Service providers who hold themselves out as having special skills will be held to a higher 
standard. To an extent, this reflects the requirement in s 961B(2)(d) of the Further Measures 
Act, which requires advice providers to assess whether they have sufficient expertise to 
provide advice on the subject matter sought by the client.  
The second requirement in s 60 of the ACL is that the service be rendered with ‘due care’. 
The term ‘due care’ was used in the implied warranty provision in the repealed s 74(1) of the 
Trade Practices Act. In that context, it was held to mean that services must be carried out in 
a workmanlike manner and that the warranty would be breached if work were carried out in 
a careless and unskilled manner.149 Given the similarity between the best interests duty and 
the requirement of ‘due care and skill’, there is already the problem of the duty being 
overlaid on top of the existing common law implied term of due care and skill. There are also 
parallels with the use of the term in s 60 of the ACL. Whether this will colour the 
interpretation of the best interests duty remains to be seen. It can be said, however, that 
there is the potential for considerable uncertainty to be made out of such comparisons.  
‘Fiduciary-like’ duty? 
It is unclear to what extent the best interests duty will be considered in light of fiduciary 
principles. As the discussion in Part III noted, the best interests duty approach in the Further 
Measures Act represents a clear departure from the idea of a statutory fiduciary duty. 
However, given that the duty was originally described as ‘fiduciary’ in the Information Pack 
and that that language remains in the Explanatory Memorandum, it is not completely clear 
that the tension between the two approaches has been definitively resolved. Given the 
differences between the concept of a best interests duty and a fiduciary duty, the courts are 
unlikely to interpret s 961B in light of fiduciary principles, but the risk remains. Some authors 
have also questioned whether a fiduciary duty can be imposed by statute at all.  Doing so, 
they argue, displays a misunderstanding of the circumstances in which fiduciary obligations 
arise.150 The lingering doubt about the best interest duty’s supposed ‘fiduciary’ character 
means that there is a risk the legislation will cause ‘acute legal incoherence’.151 
If the duty were interpreted as being fiduciary in character, an associated problem arises. 
According to Kingsford-Smith, some of the cases that have applied ‘best interests’ provisions 
                                                 
149 Gharibian v Propix Pty Ltd (T/A Jamberoo Recreational Park) [2007] NSWCA 151 at [57]; Read v 
Nerey Nominees Pty Ltd [1979] VR 47 at 48-49 (Marks J). 
150 Craddock, above n 136, 224–225. 
151 Ibid 225.  
 33 
elsewhere have ‘interpreted [those provisions] according to fiduciary principles’.152 One of 
the points made by industry in the submissions on the government’s Exposure Drafts was 
that it is common practice to treat advisers as fiduciaries. According to the Hon Kevin 
Lindgren QC, financial advisers owe fiduciary obligations to their clients, ‘at least in relation 
to the typical professional adviser or planner in contemplation’.153 It is conceivable that the 
best interests duty could be treated as ‘fiduciary-like’, and imposed on top of an extant set 
of fiduciary obligations arising out of the common law. According to Kingsford-Smith, with 
regard to those other provisions that have been interpreted in ‘in light of fiduciary 
principles’, it took ‘many years before the relationship between the judge-made fiduciary 
law and the statutory analogue [had] been settled’.154  
Catch-all step in s 961B(2)(g) 
The steps in s 961B(2) are an attempt to add clarity to the best interests duty by setting out, 
in detail, one way advisers can comply with the duty. The problem is that the presence of 
the catch-all provision in s 961B(2)(g) makes these steps fundamentally uncertain. It requires 
advisers to take any other steps (additional to steps (a) – (f)) that ‘would reasonably be 
regarded as being in the best interests of the client’. The rationale for this provision is well 
intentioned: Parliament did not intend  s 961B(2) to be an ‘exhaustive and mechanical 
checklist’.155 Notwithstanding this, the effect of the provision is that it makes the steps in s 
961B(2) open-ended where their original purpose was to provide clarity.156 As a result of this 
uncertainty, some in the industry have argued that it will be impossible to design efficient 
processes for delivering advice.157 Arguably, however, this is precisely the point of the new 
law: the elimination of static and inflexible advice models that do not take full account of the 
client’s relevant circumstances. ASIC’s proposed guidance on complying with the best 
interests duty mentions that what is needed to comply with the obligation is different in 
each case, and advisers will be expected to exercise their own judgment.158  
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Relationship between the best interests duty and other pre-existing conduct 
obligations 
The final point is that the best interests duty adds yet another layer of legal complexity to 
the other conduct obligations governing the provision of financial advice. It is unclear how 
the best interests duty will interact with these pre-existing obligations.159  In particular, it is 
unclear where the best interests duty stands in relation to the contractually implied term of 
due care and skill (an obligation which is supplemented by s 12ED(1)(a) of the ASIC Act). 
Craddock argues that the requirement for providers of advice to exercise due care and skill 
does not permit ‘an outcome in which the client’s interests are subservient to those of the 
adviser’.160 He goes on to argue that the repealed s 945A of the Corporations Act would also 
not have permitted such an outcome.161 It is unclear, then, what the best interests duty adds 
to the existing regime of conduct obligations. This, it is argued, adds to the uncertainty in 
how the duty is to be applied.  
Given the uncertainty of the best interests duty, the Courts will play an important role in 
clarifying what is required of advice providers. However, due to the cost of litigation, 
interpretation of the best interests duty is likely to fall on the FOS in the first instance. It may 
be some time before test cases start coming through the Courts. In the meantime, both 
consumers and advice providers will be required to bear the consequence of uncertainty: 
increased cost. This issue is addressed further below.  
C. Is the best interests duty able to be effectively enforced? 
If consumers are unable to understand the protections they are afforded (or if their lawyers 
do not adequately understand these protections) because of uncertainty in legislation, then 
legislative protections are not readily enforceable. In the face of uncertainty, consumers are 
dissuaded from engaging the regulator or initiating litigation. This means potential violations 
of consumers’ rights are not investigated, which in turn effectively means the protections 
that afford such rights are not being enforced.162 There is already a lack of awareness by 
consumer investors about their rights, and nothing in either piece of FOFA legislation that 
tries to rectify this. If consumers do pursue complaints about advice providers they claim 
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have not fulfilled the best interests duty, they are most likely to go through the FOS. 
However, it is doubtful that even the FOS will hear many such complaints given consumer 
investors’ lack of awareness about providers’ internal and external dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Batten and Pearson argue ‘the bottom line is that regulation is only as good as 
its enforcement’.163  
D. Do the benefits of the best interests duty outweigh the 
costs? 
A characteristic of effective legislation is that the costs involved in implementing new 
reforms are outweighed by the benefits gained. The best interests duty will come at 
considerable cost to industry and consumers alike, and it does not appear that these costs 
will be outweighed by the benefits gained. Providers of advice will have to alter their 
business models in order to comply with the requirements of the best interests duty. The 
uncertainty in how the duty operates will drive up compliance costs, as advice providers do 
not have a clear path to follow in order to ensure compliance.  
There are other reasons the best interest duty will create high compliance costs. As 
explained above, the best interests duty adopts a highly contextualised approach to the 
giving of financial advice. The best interests duty requires advice providers to place the 
client and his or her relevant circumstances at the centre of the provider’s considerations 
and to always act in furtherance of that client’s best interests. This will necessitate the 
development of more complicated and comprehensive advice models. More comprehensive 
advice models will come at a cost. The process of developing such models will also attract 
costs. The RIS in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum provides a very thin analysis of the 
costs involved in implementing the best interests duty.164 The RIS in the Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum merely notes that costs will be incurred as firms are forced to review their 
practices and, where necessary, update their advice models.165 The prescriptive character of 
the best interests duty will also lead to higher compliance costs,166 a fact recognised in the 
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RIS.167 Had the government simply legislated a statutory fiduciary duty, it is doubtful that the 
compliance costs would be as great. The Trust Company made this point in their submission 
to the 2011 PJC inquiry into the FOFA Bills: ‘the costs involved in discharging a duty of loyalty 
[are] negligible’.168  
It is important to consider the likely flow-on effects of high compliance costs. First, high 
compliance costs will affect the advice industry. They are likely to lead to a decrease in the 
number of financial advisers across Australia, as provider institutions undertake cost-cutting 
measures. It is also likely to lead to industry-wide consolidation, which will see ‘larger 
institutionally owned dealer groups (licensees) acquire a number of smaller dealer groups to 
grow their adviser numbers and achieve economies of scale’.169 Since the reforms became 
law in July 2012, industry consolidation appears to be taking place.170  
High compliance costs directly affect consumers. Consolidation in the industry reduces 
competition, which in turn limits consumer choice. Increased market power allows larger 
institutions to charge higher fees. It also makes it more difficult for smaller, independent 
firms to survive, forcing consumers to seek advice from larger, more impersonal 
organisations (which may not be their preference). The RIS also points to a likely 
‘rationalisation of investment products’.171 This too may serve to push up costs for 
consumers.  
Costs associated with tailoring advice to meet the new legislation will be passed onto 
consumers, as businesses will be forced to pay more for professional indemnity insurance.172 
This may have the effect of making advice less accessible to Australians, as prohibitive costs 
would deter potential new clients. The end result would be that one of the long-term goals 
of the FOFA reforms – facilitating access to financial advice – could be undermined. 
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V Conclusion 
The provisions of the ASIC Act and the Corporations Act regulating misleading conduct in 
relation to the provision of financial advice have been described as a ‘tangled legislative 
weave’173 and ‘a labyrinth of statutes’,174 a ‘legislative morass’,175 and a ‘legal porridge’.176  
The best interest duty adds another layer of regulation to an already complex area of 
consumer protection. 
No form of regulation is perfect; each has its own costs and benefits. The success of any 
consumer protection legislation, however, depends on consumers knowing what their rights 
are and their ability to exercise their rights under the legislation. In drafting the best 
interests duty the government has opted for a flexible approach that is designed to take into 
account the individual circumstances of each investor. The nature and scope of the best 
interests duty is far from clear. It represents an attempt to balance certainty and flexibility, 
but the question of its ‘fiduciary-like’ character remains. ASIC’s consultation papers attempt 
to clarify the duty, and it will be interesting to see whether its finalised guidance will provide 
any additional certainty. Even clear guidance from ASIC will only go so far. It will be many 
years before the Courts can interpret and clarify the content of the duty, especially as 
uncertainty means that consumers will likely be dissuaded from engaging is costly litigation. 
For this reason enforcement will be problematic. Finally, the compliance costs that will 
accompany the new reform may outweigh its potential benefit. The business of providing 
personal financial advice (as opposed to general advice)177 plays an important part in both 
maintaining and consolidating the wealth of Australians. However, under the new regime, 
the provision of personal financial advice will be made more difficult, complex and costly 
and these costs will be passed on to consumers.  
Is there still scope for delivering standardised, non-tailored advice in the light of the best 
interests duty? In the past standardised advice has allowed large amounts of low-level, 
generic advice to be delivered very efficiently. However, great care needs to be taken: 
personal advice by definition requires that the objectives, financial situation and needs of 
the particular person seeking the advice be taken into account. Standardised advice should 
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only be used rarely, and only after a careful assessment has been made to ensure that a 
standardised approach is appropriate. 
One of the goals the FOFA reforms seek to achieve is to promote confidence in financial 
advisers. The legislation is intended to achieve this by raising the financial advice industry to 
the status of a profession. This could have been achieved by subjecting financial advisers to 
the same consumer guarantees that apply to other suppliers of professional services to 
consumers under the ACL.178 There is more certainty surrounding the meaning of the 
guarantees of due care and skill, fitness for purpose or desired result, and supply within a 
reasonable time. This would also have the advantages of uniformity and consistency. 
Alternatively, the best interests approach could have been adopted, but in a slightly 
different form. Rather than taking the convoluted and confusing approach in the Further 
Measures Act, the term ‘best interests’ could have been provided with a clear definition, as 
opposed to being broken down into a list of steps. ‘Acting in the best interests of the client’ 
could have been defined to mean taking into account all the client’s relevant circumstances 
and giving advice that is appropriate because it matches the client’s financial needs, goals 
and objectives. In doing so, providers of financial advice would have been required to treat 
the interests of the client as paramount. Advice providers could also have been required to 
explain the advice they give to consumers, or otherwise ensure that their clients understand 
the advice they are given.179 Similarly, providers could have been required to ensure that 
clients have at least some idea of their consumer rights and remedies at the time when they 
receive the advice. Finally, any reference to the best interests duty being ‘fiduciary-like’ 
could have been eliminated from the extrinsic material.  
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